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EINSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
Bt'uce Hoi me i" 
Consider a beginning scientist who pJans to perform 
a series of experiments. Before he can begin he must 
have a philosophical basis from which he will plan his 
activity. For instance, why does he perform 
experiments in the first place? Could he not achieve 
results in extending knowledge by pure thought, without 
performing experiments? If he does decide on carrying 
out experiments, then he must be assured that he 
actually measures qualities which have meaning. Once 
he has collected the data and combined it with all the 
previously collected data, can he hope to make order 
out of the array of empirical data, and how can his 
theorizing create this order? Admittedly, all 
scientists have at least vaguely answered these basic 
questions, but one must note that the seienlists of 
great intellectual stature have carefully considered 
these and similar issues as they formed their 
individual scientific; philosophies. 
Of particular interest, not only because of his 
contributions to science, but also because he spoke in 
great detail about his own philosophy, is Albert 
Einstein. This paper will cover only three main 
aspects of Einstein's philosophy of science: the 
nature of the universe, the relationship between 
sensory experience and our concept of reality, and the 
construction of scientific theory. To Einstein all 
understanding of the physical universe starts with 
empirical data, and this data can be correlated and 
understood, for the universe has an implicit 
mathematical structure. Furthermore, the formation of 
our perception of reality is a two-step process: 
first, the formation of the concept of a bodily object 
which corresponds to certain repeatedly occurring 
complexes of sense impression, and second, the 
attribution of significance to this concept. 
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Comprehension of sense experiences, and Uhus reality, 
is then possible through the ordering of our concepts 
of bodily objects. Finally, Einstein preceived the 
construction of scientific theory as an interplay 
between reason and experience. Basic postulates, 
conceived entirely by free invention of the mind, are 
the basis of a theory, and all concepts and relations 
among concepts which are directly related to our 
sensory experience can be derived from this basis. 
Since the scope of eacli point cannot be appreciated 
without further discussion, I shall examine all these 
points in more detail. 
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If one is to understand the nature of the physical 
universe, then according to Einstein one must begin 
with sensory experiences. lie believed that 
"conclusions obtained by purely rational processes are, 
so far as Reality is concerned, entirely empty."' 
"This conviction does not rest on the supposition that 
anyone has actually proved the impossibility of gaining 
knowledge of reality by means of pure speculation, but 
rather upon the fact that the empirical . . . procedure 
alone has shown its capacity to be the source of 
knowledge."2 Yet this is not. to say that reason has no 
part in the acquisition of knowledge, for one must also 
avoid the other extreme: "naive realism, according to 
which things 'are' as they are perceived by us through 
our senses."^ Thus, as the reader will later clearly 
see, understanding of the universe comes about through 
the interaction between reason and experience. 
Experience alone can lead to a knowledge of 
Nature's structure; moreover, its very structure is 
mathematical. Einstein often spoke of the liarmony of 
the universe, fie was motivated to search for this 
harmony by a feeling for "the sublimity and marvelous 
order which reveal themselves both in nature and in the 
world of thought."'' He claimed that one can express 
mathematically the harmony and order of the universe. 
Physics has shown that scientific concepts and 
propositions lend themselves to mathematical 
formulation, and furthermore: "Our experience fin 
science I up to date justifies us in feeling sure that 
in Nature is actualized the ideal of" mathematical 
simplicity.""' Einstein used the General Theory of 
Relativity to ilInstate the point of mathematical 
simp!ici ty: 
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The physical world is represented as 
a four-dimensional continuum. If in 
this I adopt a Riemannian metric, 
and look for the simplest laws which 
such a metric can satisfy, I arrive 
at the relativistic gravitation-
theory of empty space. If I adopt 
in this space a vector-field, . . 
and if 1 look for the simplest laws 
which such a field can satisfy, 1 
arrive at the Maxwell equations for 
free space.6 
Thus the laws of Nature are fundamentally simple 
elements of a mathematical structure; however, the 
mathematical structure itself may be quite abstract. 
Although Nature seems to present us with an 
overwhelming array of sensory experience, one can, 
nevertheless, uncover the mathematical structure of 
reality. Knowledge of this mathematical structure is 
synonymous with the understanding of Nature. It is 
conceivable that many mathematical sturctures couLd be 
found to explain Nature, but Einstein believed that 
only one of the structures would be "best" (the 
criteria for "best" will be discussed later). 
Therefore, Nature can be understood uniquely; in other 
words, a unique mathematical structure which fits 
Nature exists and can be found. 
Another characteristic of the physical universe is 
that a "complete" description of reality is possible. 
By "complete" Einstein referred to the requirement that 
"every element of the physical reality must have a 
counterpart in the physical theory."7 Thus no part of 
physical reality can be excluded from the mathematical 
structure of the universe if the stiucture is to be 
complete. Equivalent to this idea of completeness is 
the deterministic view in which a direct representation 
of physical reality in space and time is possible; that 
is, the universe is exactly engineered. Yet, contrary 
to the concept of an exactly engineered universe is 
quantum theory, which incorporates a probability 
element into its mathematical structure. Einstein 
strongly objected to this element of probability, 
claiming that the presence of probability in quantum 
theory "is solely to be ascribed to the fact that 
Iquantum theoiy| operates with an incomplete 
description of physical systems." 8 Some points of 
quantum theory, however, were already well 
established—in particular, the Heisenberg uncertainty 
principle—so Einstein made the concession that no 
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"future I empirical I knowledge can compel physics again 
to relinquish our present statistical theoretical 
foundation in favor of a deterministic one . , . . 
The Heisenberg uncertainty principle excludes the 
possibility of obtaining empirical data that would 
directly contradict quantum theory. Yet, Einstein 
retained his faith in a deterministic view of Nature, 
for he felt that eventually a deterministic 
mathematical formulation could be found which would 
explain the empirical data at a deeper level and would 
not contain elements of probability. Empirical data, 
however, would not lead to this deterministic theory; 
only the intuition and ingenuity of a theorist could 
lead to its discovery. 
After considering Einstein's view of the nature of 
the universe, some possible answers arise for our 
beginning scientist's questions. According to Einstein 
the scientist must perform experiments because up to 
the present time pure thought alone has not yielded 
useful information about the physical world. The 
scientist has the assurance that Nature has an implicit 
mathematical structure which can be described 
completely and which can be uncovered. Yet, in the 
previous discussion ideas were introduced, such as 
"reality" and "concepts," that need further definition 
and discussion. The next section, therefore, will 
explore the relationship between sensory experience and 
our concept of reality. 
II 
If a scientist is concerned about whether or not 
the qualities that he measures have meaning, then he 
must first consider the processes involved in the 
formation of reality from sensory experience. As 
Einstein stated, "The whole of science is nothing more 
than a refinement of everyday thinking," and he 
continued: "j'i'he physicistj cannot proceed without 
considering critically . . . the problem of analyzing 
the nature of everyday thinking." 1 0 First of all, "we 
shall take the existence of sense experiences as given, 
that is to say as psychic experiencs of |al special 
kind."" After assuming the actuality of sensory 
experiences one now finds that the formation of a "real 
external world" involves two steps: the formation of 
the concept of a bodily object and the attribution of 
significance lo this concept. 
Einstein describes the first of these steps in the 
following manner: 
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Out of the multitude of our sense 
experiences we take, mentally and 
arbitrarily, certain repeatedly 
occurring complexes of sense 
impression . . . and we attribute to 
them . . . the meaning of the bodily 
object. Considered logically this 
concept is not identical with the 
totality of sense impressions 
referred to; but it is an arbitrary 
creation of the human (or animal) 
mind. On the other hand, the 
concept owes its meaning and its 
justification exclusively to. the 
totality of the sense impressions 
which we associate with it. 1 2 
Thus, the process involves the selection of certain 
sense impressions which one groups together and then 
their association with the concept of a bodily object. 
When a certain set of sense impressions turns up in 
many memory-pictures, then it becomes an ordering 
element for a series of such memory-pictures in that it 
connects memories which in themselves are unconnected. 
"Such an element becomes an instrument, a concept." l J 
Yet, a concept formed in one's mind is not the sum of 
all the particular sensory experiences in the memory 
that coincide witli the concept, but it is something 
independent—a free creation of the human mind. Thus, 
a concept is somewhat removed from the sensory 
experiences to which it pertains. This gap between 
data of sense and concepts of thought is not easily 
noticed since we tend to combine certain concepts with 
certain sensory experiences. 1/1 Actually, "the 
connection of the elementary concepts of everyday 
thinking with complexes of sense experiences can only 
be comprehended intuitively and it is unadaptable to 
scientifically logical fixation."15 
After this concept of a bodily object is formed one 
attributes significance to it. Einstein explains this 
second step in the setting up of a "real external 
world" in the following statement: 
in our thinking . . . we 
attribute to this concept of the 
bodily object a significance, which 
is to a higu degree independent of 
the sense impression which 
originally gives rise to it. This 
is what we mean when we attribute to 
the bodily object "a real 
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existence." The justification of 
such a setting rests exclusively on 
that fact that, by means of such 
concepts and mental relations 
between them, we are able to orient 
ourselves in the labyrinth of sense 
impressions. These notions and 
relations, although free statements 
of our thoughts, appear to us as 
stronger and more unalterable than 
the individual sense experience 
itself . . . . On the other hand, 
these concepts and relations, and 
indeed the setting of real objects 
and, generally speaking, the 
existence of "the real world," have 
justification only insofar as they 
are connected with sense impressions 
between which they form a mental 
connection.''' 
"The real world," and therefore our concept of reality, 
is* just a result of the significance that one 
attributes to the concepts of objects. These concepts 
are free statements of our thoughts, yet one employs a 
particular set of concepts because that set is useful. 
The essential criterion for the usefulness of a set 
of concepts is that the world of sense experience 
becomes comprehensible through the application of that 
set of concepts. Comprehensibility of the world 
proceeds from the production of some sort of order 
among sense impressions. It is the creation of general 
concepts and relations between these concepts that 
produces the desired order, and thus comprehensi-
bility.'7 The origin of concepts thus lies in free 
invention of the mind, while the function and 
justification of these concepts resides in the ordering 
of experience. Now, if one considers physical reality, 
the formation of reality becomes the commitment to a 
statement of a set of rules, rules guiding the creation 
of general concepts and relations between the concepts. 
Success in bringing about order is the sole determining 
factor in the selection of these rules. While the 
rules themselves are arbitrary, their rigidity makes 
the setting up of a real external world possible. 
"However, the fixation (of the rules) will never be 
final. It will have validity only for a special field 
of application (i.e., there are no final categories in 
the sense of Kant)."' 8 Any set of rules is allowable 
as long as it leads to the desired result. 
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Recapitulating the processes at work in the 
formation of reality from sense experience, one finds 
that our concept of "the real world" is determined by 
concepts which arange the array of sensory experience. 
The general concepts, which are free creations of the 
mind, and relations between them must satisfy the 
condition that they create order in our perception of 
Nature, and thus make the world comprehensible. Now, 
how does this explanation of reality help our beginning 
scientist, who needs assurance that he actually 
measures qualities that have meaning? One thing is 
clear: the qualities that he measures must correspond 
to the specific set of concepts which he uses to set up 
reality. A problem, though, seems to present itself, 
for what if our scientist picked a new set of concepts 
for defining reality—how will this affect the theory 
based on his perception of the experimental results? 
Probable answers to this question will not be apparent 
until we explore the processes behind the creation of a 
scientific theory. 
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Up to this point I have outlined the philosophical 
considerations behind the collection of experimental 
data, but now consider what Einstein said about the 
formation of a theory from this data: "The essential 
thing is the aim to represent the multitude of concepts 
. . . , close to experience, as theorems, logically 
deduced and belonging to a basis . . . of fundamental 
concepts and fundamental relations which themselves can 
be chosen freely . . . ."'9 More specifically, one 
begins with the general concepts (from now on called 
"primary concepts") which are directly and intuitively 
connected with sensory experiences, then "one invents a 
system with fewer] concepts and relations, a system 
retaining the primary concepts and relations of the 
'first layer' as logically derived concepts and 
relations2° This new layer has a greater logical 
unity than the first layer, because it contains fewer 
concepts and relations. "Further striving for logical 
unity brings us to a tertiary system . . . . Thus the 
story goes on until we have arrived at a system of the 
greatest conceivable unity . . . . " 2 l The importance 
of this last system, which contains the most basic 
concepts and laws, cannot be overstated. Einstein once 
explained: 
"The basic concepts and laws which 
are not logically further reducible 
constitute the indispensable and not 
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rationally deducible part of the 
theory. It can scarcely be denied 
that the supreme goal of all theory 
is to make the irreducible basic 
elements as simple and as few as 
possible without having to surrender 
the adequate representation of a 
single datum of experience."" 
Thus, a theory can be judged by two criteria, one 
empirical and the other rational. First of all, a 
theory must not contradict empirical facts, and it must 
apply to and explain the largest realm of experience 
possible. Moreover, a theory should make the universe 
as "rational" as possible. Equivalent to this 
rationality is the "logical simplicity" of the most 
basic concepts. The simpler theory is the theory which 
is based on the smaller number of logically independent 
fundamental concepts. The logically simpler theory, 
however, is mathematically more abstract. 
The structure of a theory is now evident; 
futhermore, the dynamic process that creates such a 
structure is the interplay between reason and 
experience. Reason provides the structure, whereas 
experience is the sole judge of the theory's validity. 
The structure of the theory is not derived by logical 
induction from empirical data, for the most basic 
concepts, which possess the greates logical unity, 
cannot be deduced logically from the primary concepts, 
but rather the most basic concepts are free inventions 
of the human mind whose only justification is the 
correspondence of the concepts logically derived from 
them with the data of experience. To illustrate the 
arbitrary nature of the basic concepts consider 
Newtonian physics and the General Theory of Relativity, 
each of which in its consequences leads to a large 
measure of agreement with experience, but each of which 
uses basic principles very far removed from those of 
the other.2J 
Now that one realizes that the basic concepts of a 
theory are free inventions of the human mind, has one 
any right to hope that he shall find the correct way to 
an ultimate theory? For, 
one might suppose that there were 
any number of possible systems of 
theoretical physics all with an 
equal amount to be said for them; 
and this opinion is no doubt 
correct, theoretically. But 
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evolution has shown that at any 
given moment, out of all conceivable 
constructions, a single one has 
always proved itself absolutely 
superior to all the rest. Nobody 
who has really gone deeply into the 
matter will deny that in practice 
the world of phenomena uniquely 
determines the theoretical system, 
in spite of the fact that there is 
no logical bridge between phenomena 
and their theoretical principles. ' 
Einstein felt strongly that there is the correct "path" 
to an ultimate theory and that it is In one's power to 
find that path. Yet Einstein's philosophy will not 
allow the ultimate theory to be a "perfect theory" 
which will keep its form and construction for eternity, 
because the form and construction of the theory is 
dependent upon the particular set of primary concepts 
that one chooses to order sense experience. If the 
primary concepts are changed, then the form and 
structure of the "perfect theory" must necessarily 
change. The correct "path" to the ultimate theory may 
be found, however, for a given set of primary concepts. 
Tn this case the most basic concepts may change in form 
again and again but will converge toward a final set of 
fundamental principles which will be the basis of an 
ultimate theory. 5 
The idea of changing our set of primary concepts 
used for ordering reality brings up the problem that 
our beginning scientist faced: how will this change in 
concepts affect the theories based on his perception of 
the experimental results? Since the primary concepts 
must agree with the logical consequences of the 
theory's basic concepts, a change in the primary 
concepts can conceivably cause a change in the form of 
these basic concepts. This change in the basic 
concepts is most likely connected with the fact that a 
set of primary concepts does not exactly represent the 
entirety of sensory experience. Thus: 
"It may be argued that the arbitrary 
selection of complexes of sense-
experiences represents a sort of 
interference with the given totality 
of sense-impressions. We should be 
conscious that such interference, 
implied in the formation of primary 
concepts, is of still greater 
significance when secondary concepts 
and the laws of their interrelations 
. . . are concerned."2*' 
Moreover, a change in the set of primary concepts used 
for ordering reality could be the key for achieving a 
breakthrough in the striving for greater logical unity 
at the level of basic concepts, for if one finds that 
all attempts to achieve greater logical unity among the 
basic concepts fail, then one might attempt to pick a 
new set of primary concepts for which one might find a 
group of basic concepts with greater logical unity than 
those associated with the old set of primary concepts. 
In the fear that our beginning scientist might 
become lost in the above speculations, perhaps it would 
be best to summarize the construction of scientific 
theory: 
Physics constitutes a logical system 
of thought which is in a state of 
evolution, and whose basis cannot be 
obtained through distillation by any 
inductive method from the 
experiences lived through, but which 
can only be attained by free 
invention. The justification (truth 
content) of the system rests in the 
proof of usefulness of the resulting 
theorems on the basis of sense 
experiencs, where the relations of 
the latter to the former can only be 
comprehended intuitively. Evolution 
is going on in the direction of 
increasing simplicity of the logical 
basis. In order further to approach 
this goal, we must make up our mind 
to accept the fact that the logical, 
basis departs more and more from the 
facts of experience, and that the 
path of our thought from the 
fundamental basis to these resulting 
theorems, which correlate with sense 
experiences, becomes continually 
harder and longer. 2 
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